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Did the Adoption of IFRS Affect 
Corporate Tax Avoidance?
Oliver Nnamdi Okafor, Akinloye Akindayomi, and Hussein Warsame*
P R É C I S
Cet article examine si l’adoption des normes internationales d’information financière 
(IFRS) a eu une incidence sur l’évitement fiscal des sociétés au Canada. Sur la base de 
3 200 ensembles de données d’entreprise annuelles de 400 entreprises canadiennes 
cotées en bourse qui ont adopté les IFRS et de 400 entreprises américaines cotées en 
bourse, pour lesquelles on a effectué un appariement biunivoque à l’aide de 
l’appariement des coefficients de propension, les résultats de régression des auteurs 
montrent que l’adoption des IFRS a été suivie par une diminution du nombre de cas 
d’évitement fiscal des entreprises au Canada, du moins à court terme. L’étude révèle une 
augmentation importante de l’impôt payé comptant au cours de la période postérieure à 
l’adoption par les entreprises canadiennes qui ont adopté les IFRS par rapport aux 
entreprises américaines qui ont appliqué les principes comptables généralement 
reconnus aux États-Unis. D’autres résultats de régression fondés sur un petit échantillon 
de contrôle d’entreprises canadiennes qui n’ont pas adopté les IFRS présentent des 
données probantes de collaboration. Les auteurs examinent en outre certains attributs 
des contribuables et des questions comptables relevés dans les notes de service 
internes de l’Agence du revenu du Canada, en particulier les craintes que l’adoption des 
IFRS puisse accroître le risque d’évitement fiscal. Bien que les auteurs trouvent des 
preuves que les entreprises qui ont adopté les IFRS et se sont engagées dans la 
comptabilité d’exercice ont payé plus d’impôts au cours de la période postérieure à 
l’adoption des normes, leur analyse ne fournit aucune preuve de relations 
statistiquement significatives entre l’adoption des IFRS et l’évitement fiscal associé à la 
gestion des revenus, la propriété d’exploitations étrangères, l’appartenance à un secteur 
d’activité, la rentabilité, ou les pertes ou radiations de valeur. Globalement, les 
conclusions des auteurs présentent des preuves empiriques préliminaires mais solides 
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College of Business and Entrepreneurship, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (e-mail: 
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Alberta CPA Education Foundation for partly funding his doctoral education, and Dr. Warsame 
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que l’adoption des IFRS est associée à une diminution de l’évitement fiscal des sociétés, 
du moins à court terme.
A B S T R A C T
This article investigates whether the adoption of international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS) affected corporate tax avoidance in Canada. Based on a 3,200 firm-year 
data set of 400 publicly listed Canadian firms that adopted IFRS and 400 listed US firms, 
matched one-to-one using propensity score matching, the authors’ regression results 
show that IFRS adoption was followed by a decrease in corporate tax avoidance in 
Canada, at least in the short run. The study finds a significant increase in cash tax paid in 
the post-adoption period by Canadian firms that adopted IFRS compared to US firms that 
used US generally accepted accounting principles. Additional regression results based on 
a small control sample of Canadian firms that did not adopt IFRS present collaborative 
evidence. The authors further test specific taxpayer attributes and accounting issues 
identified in Canada Revenue Agency internal memorandums—in particular, concerns 
that the adoption of IFRS may increase the risk of tax avoidance. While the authors find 
evidence that the IFRS firms that engaged in accrual management paid more taxes in the 
post-adoption period, their analysis provides no evidence of statistically significant 
relationships between IFRS adoption and tax avoidance associated with revenue 
management, ownership of foreign operations, industry membership, profitability, or 
impairment losses or writeoffs. Taken together, the authors’ findings present preliminary 
but strong empirical evidence that IFRS adoption is associated with a decrease in 
corporate tax avoidance, at least in the short run.
KEYWORDS: IFRS n INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS n TAX AVOIDANCE n 
CORPORATE TAXES n CANADA REVENUE AGENCY
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INTRO DUC TIO N
A recent article by Okafor, Mains, Olabiyi, and Warsame1 suggested that, on the 
basis of internal memorandums of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the tax 
 authority had concerns that the adoption of international financial accounting 
standards (IFRS) in Canada could affect the risk of inappropriate adjustments in cor-
porate tax reporting. The authors of that article called for empirical studies on the 
effects of IFRS in relation to various tax issues. Prior studies had suggested that tax 
and financial reporting are linked, and the links may vary across jurisdictions and 
time.2 Researchers have also found that the effects of IFRS on financial reporting are 
considerably heterogeneous across firms.3 Yet despite heightened interest in the 
effects of IFRS, very little is known about the impact on tax avoidance. In this study, 
we empirically investigate whether the adoption of IFRS affected corporate tax 
avoidance in Canada. We further test the effects of specific taxpayer attributes 
associated with the accounting issues identified in the CRA’s internal bulletins on 
IFRS and corporate tax avoidance, including the attributes of revenue recognition, 
ownership of foreign operations, accrual management, profitability, and impairment 
losses or writeoffs. Since prior studies have suggested that the impact of the adop-
tion of IFRS on financial reporting is not homogeneous across firms, we also test for 
the effects of taxpayer attributes such as firm size and industry membership.
Canada presents a unique setting for investigating the effects of IFRS because 
(1) its reporting environment mitigates self-selection bias,4 and (2) Canada permits 
 1 Oliver Nnamdi Okafor, Dawn Mains, Olayemi M. Olabiyi, and Hussein Warsame, “How Did 
the CRA Expect the Adoption of IFRS To Affect Corporate Tax Compliance and Avoidance?” 
(2018) 66:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-22.
 2 Martin N. Hoogendoorn, “Accounting and Taxation in Europe—A Comparative Overview” 
(1996) 5, supplement European Accounting Review 783-94 (https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09638189600000050); David A. Guenthera and Danqing Young, “The Association Between 
Financial Accounting Measures and Real Economic Activity: A Multinational Study” (2000) 29:1 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 53-72 (https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00013-6); 
Douglas A. Shackelford and Terry Shevlin, “Empirical Tax Research in Accounting” (2001) 31:1-3 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 321-87 (https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00022-2); 
In-Mu Haw, Bingbing Hu, Lee-Seok Hwang, and Woody Wu, “Ultimate Ownership, Income 
Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions” (2004) 42:2 Journal of Accounting 
Research 423-62; Maria Gee, Axel Haller, and Christopher Nobes, “The Influence of Tax on 
IFRS Consolidated Statements: The Convergence of Germany and the UK” (2010) 7:1 
Accounting in Europe 97-122 (https://doi.org/10.1080/17449480.2010.485382); and Oliver 
Nnamdi Okafor, “Effects of IFRS on Accounting Quality and Tax Aggressiveness: Evidence 
from Canadian Mandatory Adoption” (PhD dissertation, Faculty of Graduate Studies, 
University of Calgary, 2015) (http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/25824).
 3 Holger Daske, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, and Rodrigo Verdi, “Adopting a Label: 
Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions” (2013) 51:3 
Journal of Accounting Research 495-547; and Michel Blanchette, François-Éric Racicot, and 
Komlan Sedzro, IFRS Adoption in Canada: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact on Financial 
Statements (Toronto: Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, October 2013).
 4 Hai Q. Ta, “Effects of IFRS Adoption on Earnings Quality: Evidence from Canada” 
(PhD dissertation, Drexel University, 2014).
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firms listed on a US stock exchange to use US generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP) for financial reporting, thus presenting an opportunity for an 
additional control sample from the same institutional environment.5 We draw on 
bounded rationality theory6 and argue that organizations may adopt a satisficing 
alternative when the optimal option of maximizing after-tax income may not be 
viable owing to contexts and constraints. For example, the adoption of IFRS may 
create an uncertain reporting environment that prevents managers from pursuing 
aggressive tax avoidance in a country where tax enforcement is strong. Also, the 
additional disclosures required under IFRS may discourage aggressive tax avoidance 
by exposing firms that have greater tax-avoidance opportunities. To illustrate, Inter-
national Accounting Standard IAS  12.81 mandates firms to disclose temporary 
differences associated with investments in subsidiaries, branches, and associates, and 
interests in joint arrangements for which deferred tax liabilities have not been 
recognized,7 unlike section 3465 of pre-IFRS Canadian GAAP, which merely recom-
mends the disclosure.8
We use the non-GAAP cash effective tax rate9 as a proxy for corporate tax avoid-
ance and present empirical evidence that the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Canada 
was followed by a decreased level of corporate tax avoidance. Our main analysis 
sample is a 3,200 firm-year data set of 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and 400 
listed US firms, matched one-to-one using propensity score matching (PSM). Further, 
we find no evidence that the association between IFRS adoption and corporate tax 
avoidance was driven by revenue recognition, ownership of foreign operations, 
industry membership, profitability, and impairment losses or writeoffs. However, 
we find that IFRS firms that managed accruals paid more taxes in the post-IFRS 
adoption period.
Our findings are consistent with the predictions of bounded rationality theory 
that the uncertainty created by the change in GAAP, additional disclosures required 
under IFRS, and anticipation that the tax authority may heighten its monitoring 
 5 Oliver Nnamdi Okafor, Mark Anderson, and Hussein Warsame, “IFRS and Value Relevance: 
Evidence Based on Canadian Adoption” (2016) 12:2 International Journal of Managerial Finance 
136-60.
 6 Herbert A. Simon, “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in Charles Bartlett McQuire, ed., 
Decision and Organization (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972), 161-76 (http://innovbfa.viabloga 
.com/files/Herbert_Simon___theories_of_bounded_rationality___1972.pdf ); Jens K. Roehrich, 
Johanne Grosvold, and Stefan U. Hoejmose, “Reputational Risks and Sustainable Supply 
Chain Management” (2014) 34:5 International Journal of Operations & Production Management 
695-719 (https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-10-2012-0449); and Laura Jean Carfang, “Choices, 
Decisions, and the Call To Take Action: A Phenomenological Study Utilizing Bounded 
Rationality To Explore Complex Decision-Making Processes” (PhD dissertation, School of 
Education, Northeastern University, 2015) (http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20128379).
 7 See CPA Canada Standards and Guidance Collection, available on Knotia (Toronto: CPA) (online 
database).
 8 Ibid., part V.
 9 Also called the non-conforming cash effective tax rate.
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deterred firms from engaging in tax avoidance. This study extends the literature on 
the effects of IFRS to include corporate tax avoidance.
The discussion in the article proceeds as follows. First we present background 
for the study by reviewing the extant literature on tax effects of IFRS adoption and 
our rationale for relying on bounded rationality theory to understand whether the 
adoption of IFRS affects corporate tax avoidance. Next we present our research 
methodology, including our research design and data collection techniques. Then 
we present our empirical results, and conclude with a discussion of the findings and 
their implications for further studies.
LITER AT URE RE V IE W A ND H Y P OTHE SIS 
DE V ELO PMENT
The current study was motivated by the need for a better understanding of the 
relationship between IFRS adoption and tax avoidance. Some previous studies have 
concentrated on the effect of IFRS adoption on financial reporting, including the 
impact on comparability and the relevance of financial reporting.10 Other studies 
have investigated the effect of IFRS adoption on the cost of capital,11 accounting 
quality,12 earnings quality,13 and market reaction.14 While findings are mixed, the 
 10 Susana Callao, José I. Jarne, and José A. Laínez, “Adoption of IFRS in Spain: Effect on the 
Comparability and Relevance of Financial Reporting” (2007) 16:2 Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 148-78 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2007.06.002); 
Øystein Gjerde, Kjell Knivsflå, and Frode Sættem, “The Value-Relevance of Adopting IFRS: 
Evidence from 145 NGAAP Restatements” (2008) 17:2 Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation 92-112 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2008.07.001); Denis 
Cormier, Samira Demaria, Pascale Lapointe-Antunes, and Robert Teller, “First-Time 
Adoption of IFRS, Managerial Incentives, and Value-Relevance: Some French Evidence” 
(2009) 8:2 Journal of International Accounting Research 1-22; Nikolaos I. Karampinis and 
Dimosthenis L. Hevas, “Effects of IFRS Adoption on Tax-Induced Incentives for Financial 
Earnings Management: Evidence from Greece” (2013) 48:2 The International Journal of 
Accounting 218-47 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2013.04.003); and Okafor et al., supra 
note 5.
 11 Mohammad Salam Al-Shiab, “The Effectiveness of International Financial Reporting 
Standards Adoption on Cost of Equity Capital: A Vector Error Correction Model” (2008) 
13:3 International Journal of Business 271-98; and Holger Daske, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, 
and Rodrigo Verdi, “Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the 
Economic Consequences” (2008) 46:5 Journal of Accounting Research 1085-1142 (https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00306.x).
 12 Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman, and Mark H. Lang, “International Accounting Standards 
and Accounting Quality” (2008) 46:3 Journal of Accounting Research 467-98; and Ioannis 
Tsalavoutas and Lisa Evans, “Transition to IFRS in Greece: Financial Statement Effects and 
Auditor Size” (2010) 25:8 Managerial Auditing Journal 814-42 (https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
02686901011069560).
 13 Muhammad Nurul Houqe, Tony van Zijl, Keitha Dunstan, and A.K.M. Waresul Karim, 
“The Effect of IFRS Adoption and Investor Protection on Earnings Quality Around the 
(Notes 13 and 14 are continued on the next page.)
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preponderant view is that IFRS adoption has a net beneficial effect on financial 
reporting.
Only a few studies have examined how IFRS adoption relates to tax avoidance. 
These studies include some that 
n modelled the connection between tax and financial reporting up to IFRS 
adoption in Norway;15 
n examined the variability of effective tax rates before and after IFRS adoption 
in continental Europe;16 
n investigated the impact on tax compliance of a departure from tax-based ac-
counting to IFRS in the transition economy of China;17 
n evaluated the tax and non-tax incentives for voluntary IFRS adoption in the 
United Kingdom;18 and 
n studied the tax-induced incentives for earnings management in Greece.19 
This article contributes to the above literature by examining the adoption of IFRS 
in Canada and its impact on corporate tax avoidance. It investigates the unanswered 
research question of whether the adoption of IFRS in Canada increased corporate 
tax avoidance, as anticipated by the CRA.
World” (2012) 47:3 The International Journal of Accounting 333-55 (https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.intacc.2012.07.003); and Thomas Jeanjean, “The Effect of IFRS Adoption, Investor 
Protection and Earnings Quality: Some Reflections” (2012) 47:3 The International Journal of 
Accounting 356-62.
 14 Christopher S. Armstrong, Mary E. Barth, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Edward J. Riedl, “Market 
Reaction to the Adoption of IFRS in Europe” (2010) 85:1 Accounting Review 31-61; Joanne 
Horton and George Serafeim, “Market Reaction to and Valuation of IFRS Reconciliation 
Adjustments: First Evidence from the UK” (2010) 15:4 Review of Accounting Studies 725-51; and 
Wayne R. Landsman, Edward L. Maydew, and Jacob R. Thornock, “The Information Content 
of Annual Earnings Announcements and Mandatory Adoption of IFRS” (2012) 53:1-2 Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 34-54.
 15 Christopher Nobes and Hans R. Schwencke, “Modelling the Links Between Tax and Financial 
Reporting: A Longitudinal Examination of Norway over 30 Years up to IFRS Adoption” (2006) 
15:1 European Accounting Review 63-87 (https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180500510418).
 16 Namryoung Lee and Charles Swenson, “Shock and Law: Fin 48 Report Card, IFRS and 
Beyond” (2010) 2:3 International Journal of Economics and Finance 222-33 (https://doi.org/ 
10.5539/ijef.v2n3p222).
 17 K. Hung Chan, Kenny Z. Lin, and Phyllis L.L. Mo, “Will a Departure from Tax-Based 
Accounting Encourage Tax Noncompliance? Archival Evidence from a Transition Economy” 
(2010) 50:1 Journal of Accounting and Economics 58-73 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010 
.02.001).
 18 Jeff Ng, “Tax and Non-Tax Incentives for Voluntary IFRS Adoption: Evidence from the UK” 
(PhD dissertation, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 2010).
 19 Karampinis and Hevas, supra note 10.
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While the CRA had legitimate concerns that the adoption of IFRS in Canada 
would heighten the risk of inappropriate tax adjustments that could increase cor-
porate tax avoidance, the logic of Simon’s bounded rationality theory20 indicates 
that corporate tax avoidance would not have increased. Bounded rationality refers 
to a pattern of behaviour toward a goal within the boundary imposed by certain 
conditions and constraints in the environment, and the limitations of the actor. This 
definition is consistent with Scott’s view that individuals “act within specific, given 
constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions 
under which they are acting.”21 These individuals anticipate the consequences of 
alternative actions and choose the option that maximizes their self-interest.
As Simon explains, bounded rationality theory integrates the conditions and 
constraints on the abilities of actors, whether individuals or firms, to process infor-
mation that maximizes the expected utility of their decisions.22 Simon adds that, 
when assessing firms, the theories of bounded rationality must be modified to include 
risk, uncertainty, difficulties in finding and formulating alternatives, complexities in 
the firm’s cost function, and other environmental constraints.23 Thus, bounded 
rationality theory explains how organizations make decisions when the optimal so-
lution may not be possible owing to contexts and constraints that compel the 
decision makers to select satisficing alternatives.24
In this study, we apply the logic of bounded rationality theory to the corporate 
tax-avoidance literature. Firms, as economic entities, are motivated to minimize 
their taxes so that they can maximize after-tax income. However, firms’ reporting 
choices are subject to the conditions and constraints imposed by regulators and 
the environment. The implementation of IFRS created uncertainty for Canadian 
firms, which were required to provide additional disclosures. For example, as noted 
above, IAS  12.81 mandates the disclosure of temporary differences arising from 
investments in subsidiaries, branches, and associates, and interests in joint arrange-
ments, whereas the pre-IFRS Canadian GAAP recommended, but did not require, 
such disclosure.25 Canadian firms operate in a tax environment where the risk of 
enforcement is high and the consequences of non-compliance are significant. These 
constraints limit a firm’s ability to maximize after-tax income through tax avoid-
ance, which is likely when the firm adopts an accounting standard that lends itself 
to aggressive reporting. Our view is consistent with the findings of Allingham and 
 20 Simon, supra note 6.
 21 John Scott, “Rational Choice Theory,” in Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, and Frank Webster, 
eds., Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present (London, UK: SAGE, 2000), 
126-38, at 127-28.
 22 Simon, supra note 6, at 161-76.
 23 Ibid.
 24 See ibid. and the other sources cited in note 6, supra.
 25 See supra notes 7 and 8.
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Sandmo,26 which, based on an economic analysis of crime,27 suggest that taxpay-
ers are rational and that a decision to avoid tax depends on a tradeoff between the 
expected payoff from underreporting and the severity of the punishment if they are 
caught cheating.
Recent studies further support the view that context and constraints affect tax 
compliance. Akhand and Hubbard28 examine the relative effectiveness of coercive 
and persuasive approaches to promoting compliance and find that the use of these 
approaches in combination is more effective than the use of either separately. Farrar 
and Thorne include interactional fairness in the equation in their study and con-
clude that “compliance is highest in the presence of high information and an 
authoritative tone.”29 Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 30 argue that the government, 
through its tax authority, is the largest minority shareholder in any firm, since it 
shares both profits and deductible losses with the firm. Consistent with these find-
ings and the bounded rationality argument, we postulate that the tax law, tax 
enforcement, additional disclosure requirements, and uncertainties associated with 
the new accounting standards may constrain firms from engaging in corporate tax 
avoidance. Prior studies have also found there is a tradeoff between financial- 
reporting and tax-reporting incentives.31 At the extreme end, if the adoption of IFRS 
causes managers of firms to become more aggressive in financial reporting to the 
extent that they may commit fraud, they may become less tax aggressive to avoid 
suspicion from tax authorities.32 Therefore, we examine the alternative prediction 
that corporate tax avoidance decreases in mandatory IFRS adoption in a high 
 26 Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis” (1972) 
1:3-4 Journal of Public Economics 323-38 (https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2).
 27 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76:2 Journal of 
Political Economy 169-217.
 28 Zakir Akhand and Michael Hubbard, “Coercion, Persuasion, and Tax Compliance: The Case 
of Large Corporate Taxpayers” (2016) 64:1 Canadian Tax Journal 31-63.
 29 Jonathan Farrar and Linda Thorne, “Written Communications and Taxpayers’ Compliance: 
An Interactional Fairness Perspective” (2016) 64:2 Canadian Tax Journal 351-70, at 352.
 30 Michelle Hanlon, Jeffrey L. Hoopes, and Nemit Shroff, “The Effect of Tax Authority 
Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality” (2014) 36:2 Journal of the 
American Taxation Association 137-70 (https://doi.org/10.2308/atax-50820).
 31 Steve Matsunaga, Terry Shevlin, and D. Shores, “Disqualifying Dispositions of Incentive Stock 
Options: Tax Benefits Versus Financial Reporting Costs” (1992) 30, supplement Journal of 
Accounting Research 37-68; Kenneth J. Klassen and Amin Mawani, “The Impact of Financial 
and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs” (2000) 17:2 Contemporary 
Accounting Research 227-62; and Amin Mawani, “Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax 
and Accounting Income Considerations” (2003) 20:3 Contemporary Accounting Research 495-518 
(https://doi.org/10.1506/VNVL-GVQ9-GYYQ-Y3NK).
 32 Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew, “How Much Will Firms Pay for 
Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings” 
(2004) 79:2 The Accounting Review 387-408.
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tax-enforcement environment, at least in the short run. This is expressed in our first 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate tax avoidance decreased in mandatory IFRS 
adoption in Canada.
Leuz and Wysocki33 investigate the economics of disclosure and financial- 
reporting regulations and conclude that 
n the costs and benefits of regulatory changes are difficult to estimate, and they 
largely remain an empirical issue; 
n there is a lack of evidence on the externalities of reporting standards; 
n the empirical literature has focused heavily on US regulatory changes, with a 
shortage of evidence on major regulatory changes in other countries; and 
n it is difficult to isolate the effects of IFRS from other concurrent institutional 
changes, but important interactions between IFRS and institutional factors 
present major opportunities for research. 
Prior studies also suggest that the effects of IFRS are not homogeneous across firms. 
Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi34 classify firms as either “serious adopters” or “label 
adopters.” They then examine firm-level heterogeneity using proxies that affect 
reporting incentives, reporting behaviours, and earnings quality, including firm size, 
ownership of foreign operation, and accruals, and they find that the effects of IFRS 
adoption are not homogeneous among the adopters. Blanchette, Racicot, and 
Sedzro35 further present evidence, based on the adoption of IFRS in Canada, that 
the effects of adoption differ across firms. They find that differences between IFRS 
and Canadian GAAP have an industry effect on net income or loss, and on compre-
hensive income or loss, in the finance sector.
These findings are consistent with the concerns of the CRA discussed in recent 
studies.36 The CRA internal bulletins allude to the risk that inappropriate revenue 
recognition, impairment losses, thin capitalization, and the deduction of borrowing 
costs may increase upon IFRS adoption. Thus, it is important to investigate these 
risks, and analyze how various firm characteristics and institutional factors inter-
acted with IFRS adoption to affect corporate tax avoidance in Canada. This study 
further analyzes the interaction effects of revenue management, ownership of foreign 
operations, industry membership, firm size, profitability, accruals, and impairment 
 33 Christian Leuz and Peter D. Wysocki, “The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting 
Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research” (2016) 54:2 Journal of Accounting 
Research 525-622 (https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12115).
 34 Daske et al., supra note 3.
 35 Blanchette et al., supra note 3.
 36 Okafor, supra note 2; and Okafor et al., supra note 1.
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losses or writeoffs on the impact that the IFRS adoption had on cash taxes paid in 
Canada. Therefore, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The interaction of IFRS with firm characteristics and 
institutional factors likely affected corporate tax avoidance in Canada.
RE SE A RCH ME THO D O LO G Y
Research Design
We use the non-GAAP cash effective tax rate (our dependent variable) as a proxy for 
corporate tax avoidance. The non-GAAP cash effective tax rate was computed by 
dividing cash paid or received in income taxes by cash flow from operations. We 
gave serious consideration to the selection of our proxy because we wanted to cap-
ture the unbiased effect of IFRS on corporate tax avoidance.
Blanchette, Racicot, and Girard examine the effects of IFRS on financial ratios in 
Canada and find that “ratios computed under IFRS are not directly comparable with 
those derived under pre-changeover Canadian GAAP.”37 This suggests that proxies 
based on income statement items, such as the GAAP effective tax rate (the ratio of 
income tax expense to net income before taxes) and the accrual-based cash effective 
tax rate (the ratio of cash tax paid to net income before taxes), could produce spuri-
ous results. Since IFRS adoption may alter the calculation of the accrual-based 
numbers—for example, accounting income—researchers may not be able to isolate 
the effect of the accounting numbers on tax avoidance.
Hanlon and Heitzman38 posit that changes in tax-accounting accruals do not 
affect cash effective tax rates. Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman39 further document that 
the use of cash flows from operations as a denominator in the computation of cash 
effective tax rates eliminates mechanical effects that may arise from the use of an 
accrual-based denominator such as accounting net income. Thus, a variable that 
uses cash taxes as the numerator and cash flows from operations as the denominator 
has more desirable properties in this case.
To address a concern that IFRS may have affected the computation of cash flows 
from operating activities used as the denominator, we reviewed section 1540 of 
the pre-changeover accounting standards40 and IAS  7.41 Section  1540 and IAS  7 
 37 Michel Blanchette, François-Éric Racicot, and Jean-Yves Girard, The Effects of IFRS on Financial 
Ratios: Early Evidence in Canada (Burnaby, BC: Certified General Accountants Association of 
Canada, 2011), at 5 (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.662.1248 
&rep=rep1&type=pdf ).
 38 Michelle Hanlon and Shane Heitzman, “A Review of Tax Research” (2010) 50:2-3 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 127-78 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002).
 39 Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Devan Mescall, and Jeffrey A. Pittman, “Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate 
Tax Avoidance?” (2012) 87:5 The Accounting Review 1603-39 (https://doi.org/10.2308/
accr-50187).
 40 CPA Canada Standards and Guidelines Collection, supra note 7, part V.
 41 Ibid., part I (as of January 1, 2012).
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converged. We conclude that IFRS had no significant effect on the computation of 
cash flows from operating activities across the adoption period. Therefore, the non-
GAAP cash effective tax rate is robust for examining the effects of IFRS on corporate 
tax avoidance.
Data Collection
This study collected and analyzed two years of pre-adoption and two years of post-
adoption data, which are the years 2008 and 2009, and 2012 and 2013, respectively.42 
Data from 2007 were collected to obtain opening balances for the 2008 fiscal year. 
We used two categories of sample firms in this study: Canadian firms (treatment) 
and propensity-matched US firms (control). Three criteria were used to select firms 
for inclusion in the treatment group:
 1. listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in the period 2007-2013,
 2. adopted IFRS in 2011, and
 3. data on Bloomberg, Compustat, Yahoo Finance, and/or SEDAR.43
To obtain data on our measure of goodwill impairment, we hand-collected the 
measure from Mergent Online, which covers most of the Canadian public com-
panies. In cases where there is missing information for our variable, we manually 
search the 10-K filing of the firms through the SEDAR filing system. If the goodwill 
impairment writeoff variable is not reported in this system, we further search the 
company’s website and other business websites, such as Yahoo Finance. We obtained 
Canadian data on enforcement from the CRA’s website and the annual reports of the 
CRA to Parliament.
For the US firms used as the control sample, we obtained the financial data from 
Compustat. The US firms report under a different accounting regime, predomin-
antly US GAAP. After identifying US firms with non-missing information for most of 
our regression variables, we used a PSM (propensity score matching) approach for 
one-to-one matching of the Canadian firms with the US firms using the pre-IFRS 
measures of industry, size, profitability, and growth.44 Our final sample consists of 
3,200 firm-year observations with 400 unique firms for each of the treatment and 
the propensity-matched control samples.
The nearest-neighbour match with no replacement of the PSM approach that we 
used, in addition to various robustness checks, helps to mitigate concern that the 
results in the post-adoption period are driven by the type of firms in our treatment 
sample that recovered after the global financial crisis. All observations of our depend-
ent variable lie between zero and 1, and we coded cash tax received as zero. We note 
 42 We eliminated the year 2010 because IFRS adopters were required to restate their financial 
data for that year as if IFRS had been used for financial reporting.
 43 The System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval.
 44 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who recommended that we use this approach to 
obtain the control sample.
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that the research samples include the same firms in both the pre-adoption and post-
adoption periods. Thus, each firm also acts as its own control.
Regression Model
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to investigate corporate tax avoid-
ance and adopted explanatory variables used in previous studies. Independent 
variables include the logarithms of average total assets, market value of equity, rev-
enue, and leverage, as well as net operating loss, capital expenditure, inventory, and 
foreign operations. In addition to the variables of IFRS and POST (to control for time-
fixed effects), we added an interaction variable IFRSPOST (β3) as our main variable of 
interest, specifically to capture the tax effects attributable to IFRS adoption in the 
post-adoption period relative to the pre-adoption period between IFRS adopters and 
non-adopters. We also added an INDUSTRY dummy variable to moderate industry 
effects.
In equation 1 below, we present our baseline regression model for estimating the 
effects of mandatory adoption of IFRS on corporate tax avoidance.
CTAit =  β1(IFRSit ) + β2(POSTit ) + β3(IFRSPOSTit ) + β4log(SIZEit ) + β5log(MVEit ) 
+ β6log(REVENUEit ) + β7 log(LEVERAGEit ) + β8(INDUSTRYit ) + β9(NOLit ) 
+ β10(CAPEXit ) + β11(INVENTORYit ) + β12(FOREIGNit ) + β13(GDPGRWTt ) 
+ β14(CHGTAXt ) + β15(ENFORCEt ) + Ut, (1)
where
CTA = a corporate tax-avoidance proxy, namely, NON-GAAP CASH ETR, com-
puted as cash taxes paid or received scaled by cash flow from operations;45
IFRS = a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that adopted IFRS and zero for 
firms that did not adopt IFRS;
POST = an indicator variable that equals 1 for years after the adoption of IFRS and 
zero for the years before mandatory IFRS adoption;
IFRSPOST = an interaction variable that measures the effects of IFRS adoption;
log(SIZE) = the natural logarithm of average total assets;
log(MVE) = the natural logarithm of market value of equity;
log(REVENUE) = the natural logarithm of total sales;
log(LEVERAGE) = the logarithm of year-end total liability divided by year-end 
total equity; 
INDUSTRY = a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial and rate-regulated 
entities and zero otherwise;
NOL = an indicator variable that equals 1 for a firm with a preceding-year net 
loss and zero otherwise;
CAPEX = capital expenditures scaled by average total assets;
 45 We coded Tax refund as 0, and where either the numerator or denominator is 0, we coded 
NON-GAAP CASH ETR as 0.
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INVENTORY = total inventory scaled by average total assets;
FOREIGN = an indicator variable that equals 1 for a firm with foreign operations 
and zero otherwise;46
GDPGRWT = the annual percentage rate of growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP);47 
CHGTAX = the change in tax rate,48 measured as the difference between the tax 
rate at time t and the tax rate at time t − 1;49
ENFORCE = the percentage change in total audited files per year by the appro-
priate tax authorities;50 and
U = the idiosyncratic error.
To further test the CRA’s concerns that the change to IFRS in 2011 might result 
in an increased risk that adopters would not make appropriate adjustments for cer-
tain enumerated items,51 we identify seven vulnerable areas of accounting reporting 
that firms could target to engage in corporate tax avoidance. These contexts are 
 1. revenue management, 
 2. profitability, 
 3. foreign operations, 
 4. impairment writeoffs, 
 5. accrual management, 
 6. size, and 
 7. industry membership.52 
In other words, we anticipate that IFRS adopters within those seven contexts are 
likely to have an increased appetite for corporate tax avoidance in the post-adoption 
period. Therefore, for empirical operationalization, we have equation 2 below.
 46 Firms with foreign exchange gains or losses are identified as having foreign operations.
 47 This variable is defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 US dollars. Data obtained from 
the World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %)” (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP 
.MKTP.KD.ZG).
 48 We used lagged differencing to mitigate multicollinearity and autocorrelation.
 49 Canada, Library of Parliament, “Corporate Income Taxes in Canada: Revenue, Rates and 
Rationale,” Hillnotes, March 21, 2017 (https://hillnotes.ca/2017/03/21/corporate-income 
-taxes-in-canada-revenue-rates-and-rationale).
 50 Enforcement data were obtained from the websites of each tax authority. In particular, we 
obtained the CRA enforcement data from the CRA annual reports (see, for example, infra 
note 60).
 51 Okafor et al., supra note 1; and Okafor, supra note 2.
 52 We refer to items 1 through 5 as the primary enumerated items, and 6 and 7 as moderating 
items.
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CTAit = β1(IFRSit ) + β2(POSTit ) + β3(IFRSPOSTit ) + β4log(SIZEit ) + β5log(MVEit ) 
+ β6log(REVENUEit ) + β7log(LEVERAGEit ) + β8(INDUSTRYit ) + β9(NOLit ) 
+ β10(CAPEXit ) + β11(INVENTORYit ) + β12(FOREIGNit ) + β13(GDPGRWTt ) 
+ β14(CHGTAXt ) + β15(ENFORCEt ) + β16TARGETSit + Ut . (2)
In equation 2 above, β16TARGETSit is the vector of the seven individual contexts 
identified above. The variables for these target areas are as follows:
IFRSPOSTREV = (IFRS × POST × log(REVENUE)), an interaction variable that meas-
ures the effects of IFRS adoption within the context of revenue management.
IFRSPOSTROA = (IFRS × POST × ROA), an interaction variable that measures the 
effects of IFRS adoption within the context of the firm’s profitability. ROA is 
the return on assets, measured by dividing net income by average total assets.
IFRSPOSTFOREIGN = (IFRS × POST × FOREIGN), an interaction variable that 
measures the effects of IFRS adoption within the context of the firm’s foreign 
operations.
IFRSPOSTIMPAIR = (IFRS × POST × IMPAIR), an interaction variable that meas-
ures the effects of IFRS adoption within the context of goodwill impairment 
writeoffs. IMPAIR is the impairment of goodwill.
IFRSPOSTTACC = (IFRS × POST × TACC), an interaction variable that measures 
effects of IFRS adoption within the context of accrual management. We follow 
Hribar and Collins53 to measure TACC as net income minus cash flow from 
operations scaled by average total assets.
IFRSPOSTSIZE = (IFRS × POST × log(SIZE)), an interaction variable that measures 
the effects of IFRS adoption controlling for the firm’s size post-adoption.
IFRSPOSTINDUSTRY = (IFRS × POST × INDUSTRY), an interaction variable that 
measures the effects of IFRS adoption controlling for the firm’s industry 
membership.
All other variables in equation 2 are as defined in the list following equation 1.
We note that the seven contexts identified above empirically test the concerns 
highlighted in the CRA’s internal bulletins referred to earlier, relating to the poten-
tial negative impact of IFRS adoption on corporate tax avoidance by IFRS adopters 
in the post-adoption period. We present and discuss our findings in the empirical 
results section below.
Our rationale for controlling for enforcement effects in our analysis (ENFORCE) 
was driven by assertions in the tax-enforcement literature where Hanlon et al. state 
that the government is the largest minority shareholder in any firm because, 
through its tax authority and enforcement mechanisms, it shares in the firm’s profits 
 53 Paul Hribar and Daniel W. Collins, “Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical 
Research” (2002) 40:1 Journal of Accounting Research 105-34 (https://doi.org/10.1111/1475 
-679X.00041).
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and deductible losses.54 In addition to the rationale advanced above regarding the 
potential impact of heightened awareness of tax monitoring on firms’ corporate 
tax-avoidance behaviour, we contextualize Hanlon et  al.’s assertion within the 
bounded rationality framework by including the ENFORCE variable in our analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
We present the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the main variables 
used in this study in panels A and B of table 1, respectively. The mean (median) of 
the dependent variable, NON-GAAP CASH ETR, is 0.127 (0.029) for the 800 unique 
firms with 3,200 firm-year observations. We will further analyze descriptive statis-
tics later in this section. Recall that our design produced 400 unique Canadian firms 
that are IFRS adopters (the treatment group) and 400 unique US firms that used 
non-IFRS or US GAAP financial reporting (the control group). Each firm serves as its 
own control throughout the sample period for the main analysis and the “Canadian 
companies only” analysis.
Panel B of table 1 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample. 
The correlation coefficients show the linear interdependence (or lack thereof ) of 
the NON-GAAP CASH ETR on the predictor variables. For example, we find a negative 
(positive) and significant correlation between the variables IFRSPOST and NON-GAAP 
CASH ETR. This could signal that NON-GAAP CASH ETR increased for all companies 
after the adoption of IFRS, although one could argue that it also signals multicol-
linearity in the model. However, we note that a linear relationship between the two 
variables does not automatically mean that multicollinearity is a problem, because 
the variance of the OLS coefficient estimator does not depend only on strong linear 
relationships among the independent variables; it also depends on the size of error 
variance and the total sample variation.55 Wooldridge elucidates that “for statistical 
inference, what ultimately matters is how big β̂j is in relation to its standard devia-
tion”56 and Allison documents instances where multicollinearity can be safely 
ignored.57 We define β̂j as the OLS coefficient estimator and the index j as our main 
variable of interest, which is the interaction of POST and IFRS. Where a regression 
result signals the possibility of multicollinearity problems, we would rerun the re-
gression without the potentially offending variable to confirm the consistency of 
our results.58
 54 See supra note 30.
 55 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 5th ed. (Mason, OH: 
South-Western, Cengage Learning, 2013).
 56 Ibid., at 96.
 57 Paul Allison, “When Can You Safely Ignore Multicollinearity?” Statistical Horizons, 
September 10, 2012 (http://statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity).
 58 In fact, in our regression models, we run the multicollinearity diagnostics, and the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) show acceptable numbers for our variables of interest; this finding 
further reinforces the notion that multicollinearity problems do not influence our results.
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As part of the additional analysis we conducted, we present in panel A of table 4 
the results of the descriptive statistics for IFRS and non-IFRS adopting firms with 
NON-GAAP CASH ETR greater than zero. (Table  4 appears below in the section 
headed “Additional Sensitivity Analysis.”) For this category of firms, the mean of 
the NON-GAAP CASH ETR for the IFRS (non-IFRS) firms is 0.188 (0.219). The mean 
NON-GAAP CASH ETR for Canadian firms (IFRS =  1) in the post-adoption period 
(POST = 1) equals 0.198, while their pre-adoption mean is equal to 0.170, translat-
ing to nearly 116.5  percent of the pre-adoption NON-GAAP CASH ETR. A similar 
analysis produced a reduced percentage of approximately 105 percent for the Amer-
ican firms with mean NON-GAAP CASH ETR (IFRS = 0) in the post-adoption period 
(POST = 1) of 0.224 and in the pre-adoption period (POST = 0) of 0.213.
For pictorial contexts, we provide graphic representations in figures 1 through 3 
as complements to some of the descriptive and other analyses provided earlier. 
These graphs show the NON-GAAP CASH ETR movements across the sample period 
for firms in our overall sample (figure 1) and subsamples (figures 2 and 3). These 
graphs indicate consistent patterns with our descriptive and regression analysis 
findings.
EMPIRIC A L  RE SULT S
Regression Results
In table 2, we offer some preliminary, but strong, evidence that relative to non-
adopters, Canadian firms that adopted IFRS did not engage in corporate tax 
avoidance during the post-adoption period. Our primary variable of interest, 
IFRSPOST, is consistently positive and significant across all of the eight models at the 
5 percent or better significance level. Other variables generally have the relation-
ship and sign that we anticipated. For example, we find 
n a positive relationship between cash tax paid (the dependent variable) and 
revenue, market value of equity, GDP, and tax rate59 (independent variables); 
n a negative relationship between cash tax paid and leverage, capital expendi-
ture, and operating loss; and
n less cash tax paid by larger firms and regulated entities. 
Prior studies have documented mixed findings on the relationships between tax 
avoidance and firm characteristics.60 We also find a negative relationship between 
our proxy for tax enforcement and cash tax paid by firms. Since it seems anomalous 
 59 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the addition of some control variables.
 60 See Scott D. Dyreng, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew, “Long-Run Corporate Tax 
Avoidance” (2008) 83:1 Accounting Review 61-82; and T.J. Atwood, Michael S. Drake, James N. 
Myers, and Linda A. Myers, “Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax 
Avoidance: International Evidence” (2012) 87:6 Accounting Review 1831-60 (https://doi.org/ 
10.2308/accr-50222).
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IFRS = international financial reporting standards; GAAP = generally accepted accounting 
principles; ETR = effective tax rate.
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High tax avoiders (top quintile)
IFRS = international financial reporting standards; GAAP = generally accepted accounting 
principles; ETR = effective tax rate.
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to suggest that a decrease in audit intensity is related to a higher payment of cash 
taxes, we were concerned. However, following a tenacious bottom-up investigation, 
we found that tax authorities are strategically targeting their audits to achieve 
higher impacts with lower number of audited files. According to the CRA, in the 
2012-13 fiscal year,
[O]ur audit activities generated a higher fiscal impact per full-time equivalent (auditor). 
We did, however, complete a lower number of total audits than we did in 2011-2012. 
This is in part because of our strategic decision to focus more resources on auditing 
high-risk files.61
Our analysis indicates that while cash tax paid increased in the post-adoption 
period, the number of tax audits continually decreased over the study period. Thus, 
our findings support the CRA’s statements pertaining to the effectiveness of its 
enforcement strategy in its 2012-13 annual report to Parliament. This suggests 
that, to the extent that a tax authority is effectively involved in high-impact audits, 
more cash taxes may be collected even with a smaller number of completed files. 
However, we caution that while this conjecture has held over our short study win-
dow, it may not persist in the long run, and tax authorities would need to increase 
 61 Canada Revenue Agency, Annual Report to Parliament 2012-2013 (Ottawa: CRA, 2013), at 43 
(www.canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/migration/cra-arc/gncy/nnnl/2012-2013/images/
ar-2012-13-eng.pdf ).
















Non-financial industry low tax avoiders








Financial industry high tax 
avoiders
Non-financial industry high tax avoiders
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their audit intensity to collect more taxes. Further, we rerun our regression without 
the enforcement variable, and our findings (not tabulated) remain consistent. Thus, 
our study has found overwhelming empirical evidence that does not support the CRA’s 
anxieties regarding the likelihood that IFRS adopters would pay less tax in the post-
adoption period. After we have controlled for factors that tend to increase the 
likelihood that more cash taxes would be collected, including revenue, profitabil-
ity, change in tax rate, GDP growth, and enforcement, our variable of interest— 
IFRSPOST—remains significantly positive. We further test empirically the CRA’s 
concerns highlighted in the related bulletins that there is an increased risk that 
companies would not make appropriate adjustments for certain enumerated items.
As previously noted, we identify the following vulnerable areas of accounting 
reporting that firms could target to engage in corporate tax avoidance: 
 1. revenue management (IFRSPOSTREV ), 
 2. profitability (IFRSPOSTROA), 
 3. foreign operations (IFRSPOSTFOREIGN), 
 4. impairment writeoffs (IFRSPOSTIMPAIR), 
 5. accrual management (IFRSPOSTTACC), 
 6. size (IFRSPOSTSIZE), and 
 7. industry membership (IFRSPOSTINDUSTRY). 
We report the results of this empirical exercise in model 2 through model 8 of 
table 2. From these seven model tests, IFRS post-adoption variables are not statistic-
ally significant for revenue management, foreign operations, industry membership, 
firm size, profitability, and impairment writeoffs or losses. On the other hand, we 
obtain positive and significant results for the IFRS post-adoption variable relating to 
accrual management. This indicates that there is no empirically justifiable support 
for the CRA’s anxiety regarding the use of these targets or vulnerable areas, includ-
ing accrual management, as sources of corporate tax avoidance following IFRS 
adoption. (IFRSPOSTTACC in model 5 shows positive and significant results at the 
5 percent or better significance level.) In other words, our results suggest that rela-
tive to non-adopters, Canadian firms that have adopted IFRS appear to engage in 
less corporate tax avoidance during the post-adoption period even as they engage 
in more accrual management. This finding arising from the interaction of IFRS with 
accrual management is consistent with the findings of prior studies that firms forgo 
tax benefits for financial reporting benefits.62
To address the concern that the variables MVE and SIZE might be capturing the 
same measure of firms’ overall size, we rerun our regression twice, each time omit-
ting one of these variables. The results (which are not tabulated here for readability 
and parsimony) do not change our findings and remain qualitatively similar.
 62 See the sources cited in note 31, supra.
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Additional Sensitivity Analysis
Median Analysis of Enumerated Items
To ensure that the potential skewness of our data on either extreme of the data-
points plane does not drive our results, we conduct a median analysis of equation 2 
above and present the results in table 3. These analyses relate only to the continu-
ous variables, since performing such analyses using a dichotomous variable may 
generate spurious and misleading inferences.63 The inferences of our findings 
largely hold, especially relating to the primary enumerated items.64
Non-Financial Firms, Positive Non-GAAP Cash Effective 
Tax Rate, and Alternative Control Sample
We present the regression results of other analyses that we conducted in panel B 
of table 4. First, we follow several IFRS studies that have documented the non-
homogeneous impact on firms’ financial reporting (financial versus non-financial 
firms), thereby testing whether the tax impacts are also heterogeneous.65 To this 
end, we drop all financial firms in our main sample, and we continue to find that our 
main variable of interest (IFRSPOST ) remains statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level (see model 1 in panel B of table 4). Although our sample size is thus reduced, 
we do not lose statistical analysis power since the adjusted R2 remains unchanged.
Next, we repeat our main analysis for firms with NON-GAAP CASH ETR greater 
than zero, in two ways: 
 1. We select all firms that have at least one year of NON-GAAP CASH ETR greater 
than zero in our study period (model 2 in panel B of table 4).66 The analysis 
involves a total of 2,320 firm-year observations of Canadian and US firms 
obtained from the full sample. Our main variable of interest (IFRSPOST) 
 remains positive and significant at the conventional level. 
 2. We analyze 1,929 firm-year observations that have NON-GAAP CASH ETR 
(positive CTA) greater than zero. Again, IFRSPOST continues to retain a sig-
nificant positive relationship with our proxy for corporate tax avoidance (see 
model 3 in panel B of table 4). 
Finally, we examine an alternative control sample. Recall that our control sample 
is generated through the PSM technique applied to US firms that did not adopt IFRS. 
 63 Patrick Royston, Douglas G. Altman, and Willi Sauerbrei, “Dichotomizing Continuous 
Predictors in Multiple Regression: A Bad Idea” (2006) 25:1 Statistics in Medicine 127-41 
(https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.2331).
 64 It must be noted that we do not report other control variables for parsimony and readability, 
since the control variables largely reflect similar sign, significance properties, and magnitude 
when compared with table 2.
 65 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who suggested that we conduct this analysis.
 66 We term this group “profitable firms.”
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To further check that our findings are not driven by the environmental differences 
between the United States and Canada, we rerun our regression using Canadian 
firms that did not adopt IFRS. We identify 40 Canadian firms that meet this primary 
reporting criterion and other data requirements, and 400 Canadian firms that are 
IFRS adopters. We present the results in models 4 and 5 in table 4, panel B. Our 
results consistently show that our primary variable of interest continues to maintain 
the sign and statistical significance at the conventional significance thresholds.67 We 
continue to find stability and consistency in our model properties regarding variable 
signs and significance levels. In essence, our inferences hold even when we use Can-
adian companies as a control sample. We note, however, that we have a very limited 
number of Canadian firms (40) that meet the control sample criteria.
TABLE 3 Median Analysis of Variables of Interest
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IFRSPOSTREV . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.023
(−1.26)
IFRSPOSTTACC . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.047**
(3.97)
IFRSPOSTSIZE . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.035*
(−2.03)
IFRSPOSTROA. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.015
(1.14)
IFRSPOSTIMPAIR . . . . . . . . . . 0.016
(0.87)
Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200
Adjusted R2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.256 0.259 0.257 0.256 0.256
Notes: This table presents the median analysis of the continuous variables selected to test the 
CRA’s concerns that Canadian companies adopting international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) in 2011 and beyond might avoid making appropriate adjustments for revenue 
management (IFRSPOSTREV ), profitability (IFRSPOSTROA), accrual management 
(IFRSPOSTTACC ), and impairment writeoffs (IFRSPOSTIMPAIR). The analysis also tests the 
effect of size (IFRSPOSTSIZE ). Other items, such as foreign operations and industry 
membership, are not tested because the measure of these two variables is dummy-coded and not 
continuous.
*, **  Significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
 67 We run separate regressions with and without the variable ENFORCE (model 4 and model 5) 
to confirm that the results of our regressions are not endogenously driven. In model 4, the 
Stata analysis “omitted” ENFORCE from the regression. Therefore, in model 5, we dropped 
the GDPGRWT variable to capture the effect of the ENFORCE variable.
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SUMM A RY,  DISCUSSIO N ,  A ND CO NCLUSIO N
We have examined whether the adoption of IFRS as the recommended GAAP for 
Canadian public companies in 2011 affected the tax-avoidance tendencies of these 
companies. The impact of IFRS adoption on corporate tax avoidance did not receive 
as much attention from academics as did its impact on financial reporting. Some of 
the main IFRS studies include its effect on comparability and the relevance of finan-
cial reporting, the cost of capital, accounting quality, earnings quality, and market 
reaction. The main findings are that the effect was generally positive. The few exist-
ing tax-related IFRS studies, which for the most part use European data, do not 
directly involve the likely impact of adoption on the tax-avoidance tendencies (tax 
aggressiveness) of public firms.
In designing our study, we recognized that the adoption of IFRS in Canada was 
unique, in that it was not part of the wave of European conversion that took place 
in the mid-2000s, and it was not followed by adoption in the United States. Accord-
ingly, we used a pre-post research design in which Canadian companies acted as 
their own controls. More importantly, we also took advantage of the fact that the 
United States did not adopt IFRS and, using a PSM approach, put together a non-
Canadian (US) control sample. Our main sample consists of 400 Canadian IFRS 
users matched one-to-one with 400 US firms that do not use IFRS. In the sensitivity 
tests, we made use of non-financial firms, profitable firms that paid taxes in at least 
one year of our study period, observations for which the non-GAAP cash effective 
tax rate was greater than zero, and a small sample of 40 Canadian public firms that 
did not convert to IFRS during our study period. We chose 2008 and 2009 as the 
pre-adoption period, and 2012 and 2013 as the post-adoption period. Since 2008 
and 2009 were recession years in both Canada and the United States, we are inter-
ested in the relative increases in the non-GAAP cash effective tax rate among 
different samples, and we added GDP growth as a control variable. In all, our sample 
consists of 
n 3,200 observations of US and Canadian firms for the main tests, and 
n subsamples of 2,320 observations of US and Canadian firms that paid some 
taxes, 1,929 observations for a non-GAAP cash effective tax rate greater than 
zero, and 1,670 observations of Canadian companies only, for the sensitivity 
tests.
We hypothesized that, even though the CRA warned its tax auditors about, and 
trained them to look for, tax-aggressive transactions occasioned by the conversion 
to IFRS,68 firms’ tax-aggressiveness tendencies will decrease (at least in the short 
run) after IFRS adoption owing to uncertainties and complexities created by the 
conversion. We rely on the logic of bounded rationality theory to justify our hypoth-
esis of a decrease in tax aggressiveness immediately after the adoption of IFRS. The 
 68 See Okafor et al., supra note 1.
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theory suggests that when decision makers are confronted with constraints and 
uncertainties, they make satisficing decisions. One of the main features of IFRS is 
that while it gives some flexibility to managers, it also requires disclosures about 
transactions and estimates that may cause managers to release proprietary informa-
tion. The tax authority, as a stakeholder in firms, could use such disclosures as the 
basis for additional tax audits. Therefore, managers are expected to moderate their 
tax-avoidance tendencies after IFRS adoption.
As our second hypothesis, we posited that, for the same bounded rationality 
reasons, we may not observe the tax-reducing adjustments that the CRA was con-
cerned that managers may make to certain accounting items, such as revenue, 
profitability accounts, foreign operations, impairment writeoffs, and accruals. We 
also investigated whether firm size and industry membership affect the amount of 
tax that the government collects after the adoption of IFRS. One of our most 
important decisions in operationalizing the variables that went into our regression-
based testing model was the choice of proxy for our corporate tax avoidance variable. 
Instead of using the usual GAAP-based effective tax rate as a proxy for corporate tax 
avoidance, we used the non-GAAP cash effective tax rate. Since the adoption of IFRS 
involved GAAP numbers, we argue that if either the numerator or the denominator 
of our proxy uses non-cash accounting numbers or GAAP-based tax rates, we may 
get spurious results. Therefore, our variable uses cash tax paid or received as the 
numerator and cash flows from operations as the denominator.
The results are consistent with our hypotheses and allay the CRA’s concern about 
loss of taxes owing to users of Canadian GAAP switching to IFRS. In our main tests, 
where the control sample consists of US firms, the coefficient of the main variable 
of interest (IFRSPOST) in our regression model is positive and significant at conven-
tional levels. Our interpretation of the positive coefficient of IFRSPOST in table 2, 
model 1, which captures the differential impact of IFRS after adoption, is that Can-
adian companies became less tax-aggressive, compared to US control firms, after the 
adoption of IFRS in 2011. The higher the NON-GAAP CASH ETR, the lower the tax 
aggressiveness. The results in table 2, model 1 also show that Canadian sample firms 
generally engage in more tax avoidance than their US counterparts, as indicated by 
the negative and significant coefficient of the IFRS variable. We also carried out a 
co-test of the variables IFRS and IFRSPOST, and the resultant coefficient is negative 
and significant. That is, while the Canadian IFRS-using firms became less tax- 
aggressive after the adoption year of 2011, they are still more tax-aggressive than 
the US control firms.
The sensitivity tests reported in panel B of table 4 (models 1 to 4) confirm the 
results from the main regression reported in table 2, model 1. The significant posi-
tive coefficient of the IFRSPOST variable indicates that Canadian firms that 
converted to IFRS became less tax-aggressive after 2011. In a nutshell, all the sensi-
tivity tests show that IFRS converters became less tax-aggressive after the adoption 
of IFRS in 2011. The tests also show that, in general, Canadian firms seem to be 
more tax-aggressive than US firms, while Canadian IFRS users lost some tax aggres-
siveness relative to Canadian users of US GAAP after 2011. 
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The results of the test for our second hypothesis reported in table 2, models 2 
to 8, show that the concerns of the CRA that managers may inappropriately adjust 
balances of accounts that relate to revenues, profitability, foreign operations, 
 impairment writeoffs, and accruals may not materialize after the adoption of IFRS. 
With the exception of accruals, none of the proxies for these accounts are signifi-
cant, while the coefficients of the variables of interest remain significant and the R2 
remains unchanged at 0.256. That is, while the training provided to CRA auditors to 
alert them to any inappropriately adjusted balances could be useful, it seems that 
IFRS conversion may not put the CRA at a disadvantage compared to old Canadian 
GAAP. The significant relationship between our corporate tax-avoidance proxy and 
accrual management is an interesting addition to the line of literature on the tradeoff 
that firms face in choosing between tax benefits and financial-reporting benefits. 
Our results are consistent with the findings in prior studies that firms would forgo 
tax benefits to appeal to their investors.
We ran some additional tests to rule out the possibility that our results are 
driven by measurement errors in these variables. More specifically, to rule out the 
possibility that skewness in the means of our variable NON-GAAP CASH ETR is driving 
our results, we reran the models using the median values of the variables. The coef-
ficients and the significance levels of the variables are, by and large, similar to those 
in table 2. Furthermore, the additional sensitivity tests reported in table 3 do not 
change the conclusion that the CRA’s concerns about improper adjustment of tax-
related account balances by managers after the adoption of IFRS are allayed.
Lastly, we graphically illustrated the trajectory of NON-GAAP CASH ETR across the 
sample period for our sample of IFRS and non-IFRS firms that paid taxes in the study 
period (figure 1). We also grouped tax avoidance into quintiles and graph the top 
quintile of tax avoidance (lowest NON-GAAP CASH ETR) versus the lowest quintile of 
tax avoidance (highest NON-GAAP CASH ETR) for IFRS adopters (figure 2). We then 
identified the top quintile and lowest quintile by industry membership (financial or 
non-financial) (figure 3). While figure 1 shows a consistent pattern with our descrip-
tive and regression analysis results for IFRS and non-IFRS adopters, figures 2 and 3 
suggest that the top and lowest tax avoiders tend to converge after the adoption of 
IFRS across the industry categories, at least in the short run.
Overall, the results of our study give some comfort to the tax authorities, espe-
cially to the CRA, which was concerned about potential negative impacts occasioned 
by the conversion from Canadian GAAP to IFRS for public companies. The adoption 
of IFRS does not seem to increase the tax aggressiveness of Canadian public companies, 
at least in the short run. The long-run implications of our findings could be fertile 
ground for future research. The results also give comfort to Canadian accounting 
standard setters in providing empirical evidence that they did not inadvertently 
cause Canadian public firms to become more tax-aggressive. Our findings may also 
be beneficial to other countries still contemplating the adoption of IFRS. But a 
couple of caveats are in order. We assumed that US firms are good controls for Can-
adian firms that converted to IFRS. To the extent that the controls are incongruous 
owing to different economic and standard-setting environments in Canada and the 
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United States, our results may not be relied on. However, since our Canadian con-
trol sample, albeit small in number (160 observations), gives the same results, the 
concerns are partially ameliorated. An additional caveat relates to the proxies for 
some of the variables that we used to operationalize the concerns of the CRA about 
account balance adjustments. Again, several additional analyses produce consistent 
results, and future research may further refine our measures.

